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THE SST AND INVERSE CONDEMNATION
JEROME NEIL KLINE t

Darious was clearly of the opinion
That the air is also man's dominion,
And that, with paddle or fins or pinion,
we soon or late
Shall navigate
The azure, as now we sail the sea.
JOHN TOWNSEND TROWBRIDGE

Darious Green and his Flying Machine
INTRODUCTION

N A WORLD of continually advancing economic and technological
development, changing customs and mores, increased efficiency in
general, and in rapid transit in particular, there is a great need for
our political bodies, governmental institutions, and court systems to
assume a responsive, activistic role. In particular, the advent of supersonic air transport is a most recent example of a problem which we
will have to meet. This has been adeptly stated as follows:
The SST introduces a new kind of noise into our environment,
in that it covers a very large area at high enough levels to be very
annoying to large numbers of people, and probably damaging to
property, whereas previous noises from aircraft at levels high
enough to -be disruptive have been confined to the vicinity of
airports. This new dimension of noise will undoubtedly require
development of additional legal concepts to meet it.'
During the last week of 1968, the Soviet Union became the first
nation to fly a supersonic transport, reportedly beating the United
States entry by 32 years, and the British-French Concorde SST by
weeks. 2 Prior to that time, there had been considerable controversy
t Bachelor of Science-Pennsylvania State University-1965; Juris DoctorVillanova University School of Law-1968; Master of Laws-George Washington
University Law Center-1969.
1. Report of the Secretary of the Interior of the Special Study Group on Noise
and Sonic Boom in Relation to Man, (November 4, 1968). (hereinafter cited as
UDALL REPORT.)

2. "The United States plane is scheduled to fly by mid-1972 and the Concorde
by late this month or February." Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1968, at A-1, col. 3.
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over the United States' involvement in this area." Even in 1970,
Congress and the public at large are maintaining a continuing dialogue
as to the efficacy of spending huge sums of money for our entry into
supersonic transport international competition. Naturally, great
numbers of individuals have been, and continue to be, very upset over
the potential dangers and annoyances that would accompany the SST
and its sonic boom.4 Considerable conflict has arisen due primarily to
foreign and domestic political pressures. However, after much vacillation," the Nixon administration has reached a decision in favor of
developing the SST.
In order to divert increased governmental expenditures away from
what is considered wasteful and unnecessary spending on commercial
and military supersonic transports, it is necessary to engage in a colloquy regarding present governmental decision making. Thus, the
effect of the sonic boom upon the legal theory of "inverse condemnation," and, in turn, the effect of "inverse condemnation" on the development of the SST, provide the subject matter of this article.
INVERSE CONDEMNATION

"Inverse condemnation" is not a new legal concept. Its roots
are firmly imbedded in the United States Constitution. In effect,
it is an action brought by an oppressed landowner whose land is not
formally arrogated for a public use (although allegations by petitioners
may be to the contrary), but rather is subsequently damaged by a

public improvement.7 In all cases, it is an action for damages8 based
3. Costs and the final shape of the plane as well as the sonic boom have been
impediments to U.S. SST development. "The American program also has been
mired in criticism by Congressmen, editorial writers and private citizens." N.Y.

Times, Jan. 5, 1969, at 6E, col. 1.
4. "In view of recent developments, airport authorities should consider seriously development in wide open spaces, or be prepared to meet an angry citizen
who finds his home in need of repair, and his sleep interrupted because the newest
rage in air travel has just passed over his home." Note, Property: Inverse Condemnation: A Growing Problem?, 3 TULSA L.J. 169, 175 (1966).
5. The Interior Department at one time recommended a prohibition of all but
experimental supersonic flights over inland areas until more could be known about
the. public response to sonic boom. UDALL REPORT, supra, note 1, at p. 8; see
Childs, Air Traffic Mess Isn't Being Solved, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 1968, at A-16,
col. 8; Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 1968, at A-2, col. 1; in late 1969, the Nixon Administration gave every indication that it would not recommend proceeding with development of the SST. However, the Budget Message for Fiscal Year 1971 made provisions
for $290 million to go into this program.
6. It has also been referred to as "reverse eminent domain," a term probably
more conducive to lay understanding of the concept. This theory is termed inverse
because the eminent domain clause is invoked by a private claimant rather than a
public agency.
7. See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §478 (1966). See also City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1964) ; City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C.
656, 140 S.E.2d 341 (1965) ; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d
100 (1962) ; State Highway Comm. v. Stumbo, 222 Or. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960).
8. The standard allegation arising generally in this area is that property has
been taken or damaged without just compensation having been paid.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7

2

Kline: The SST and Inverse Condemnation
SUMMER

1970]

THE

SST

AND INVERSE CONDEMNATION

889

on the eminent domain clause of the United States Constitution.'
However, there is no willingness or intention on the part of the
alleged taker to initiate appropriate proceedings.
It has further been deemed to be available where property is
taken for a public purpose by a municipality or other agency having
the power of eminent domain under such circumstances that no procedure provided by statute affords an adequate or applicable remedy to
the landowner to obtain just compensation for his property.'" Unlike
demanding relief against a governmental body on the basis of a
"nuisance" which may be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
this action may be brought under this self-executing consent for
"inverse condemnation" damages."
"Inverse condemnation" claims can be divided into two categories:
1) those arising from physical damage to property, and, 2) those arising
from non-physical damage to property. 2 These distinctions are cogently explained in the litigation process.' "Inverse condemnation"
proceedings often go beyond traditional, and outmoded dogma, which
normally allow eminent domain compensation for palpable, physical
takings only. More recent cases, as -will be later reviewed, indicate
that an impairment or destruction of property interests may give rise
to liability in accordance with the eminent domain clause notwithstanding the absence of physical invasion.
Many writers emphasize a non-overlapping or distinctness in
terms in discussing "police power" and "eminent domain."

Without

9. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. v. See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wisc. L. REV. 3. This article provides
an excellent survey of the "inverse condemnation" theory and a large sampling 6f

the multitude of problems arising thereunder; see also Mandelker, A Review of
Inverse Condemnation, ABA SECTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, REPORT OF COMM.
ON CONDEMNATION LAW PROCEDURE 193 (1964).
10. See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 478 (1966).
11. It has always been felt by judicial authorities that inverse condemnation:

is unequivocally a way of avoiding the sweep of the sovereign immunity doctrine. See
Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069,34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
12. These would include a loss of view and reasonable access, including loss of
access from change of grade. Damage due to noise, dust and fumes could be placed in
either category, tending to blur the efficacy of drawing such distinctions. Mandelker,
supra note 9, at 4-6.
13. Others have made similar characterizations as follows: 1) Government
action which works as a physical invasion of the landowner's space, e.g., flooding,
low air flights, etc. 2) Extinguishment, without physical invasion, of private rights,
by the exercise of powers under government contracts. 3) Destruction or substanitial
impairment of private property interests by regulation without physical invasion,
public improvement or government contract action, e.g. destruction of air access to
private lands by government regulation. See generally Beuscher, Some Tentative
Notes On The Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by The Courts:
So Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1968 URBAN LAW ANNUAL 1.
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immersing into this morass, it is this writer's belief that the dichotomy
is a flexible one. While the two theories are, in a sense independent,

the cases making reference to the dilemma indicate that an intransigent
approach is not desirable.1 4 Thus, this article will be concerned primarily with the fact that a right to compensation in this area emanates

directly from the Constitution" and is not dependent on police power
regulations16 or statutory mandates.
Substantive Framework for Inverse Condemnation
In inverse condemnation cases, three major avenues are open to
the courts. They may: 1) rely upon analogous doctrines in property
or tort law; 2) make an independent interpretation of the eminent
domain clause without reference to either tort or property law; or
3) make interpretations of the eminent domain clause, ostensibly not
based either on property or tort law concepts." It should be noted,
however, that no clear cut trend or analytical pattern has consistently
emerged. In fact, since a framework for this area must perforce be
flexible and dependent upon diverse factual contexts, the approaches
courts have taken have been, for the most part, extremely vague. Thus,
court rationales and theories of liability have frequently come under
attack. It has been alleged that traditional legal concepts have been
distorted and artificial interpretations have been resorted to in order
18
to find liability.
Incidental Damage v. Taking
Numerous treatises, cases, and legal doctrines have addressed
themselves to the question of what constitutes a "taking" and what
encompasses a "public purpose" as these provisions are used in the
fifth amendment.'" According to the ratiocination provided for the
14. See e.g., Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948); Nagle v.
Caddo Parrish, 173 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932); Booth v. Louisiana Highway
Comm'n, 171 La. 1096, 133 So. 169 (1931) ; Demoss v. Bossier Parrish, 167 La. 83,
118 So. 700 (1938) ; Green v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 163 La. 117, 111 So. 619 (1927).
15. Since "inverse condemnation" is premised on constitutional language, careful
attention must be paid to it. See Beuscher supra note 13, at 4.
16. In Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959), "inverse condemnation" was imposed in spite of the fact that the air flight regulation involved
was a valid police power measure.
17. Mandelker, supra note 9 at 6-7.
18. Id. at 8.
19. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1961) ; see also Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) ; United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,
357 U.S. 155 (1958) ; United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) ; United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327
(1922) ; Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Bartholomae Corp. v.
United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; State Highway Comm'n v.
Stumbo, supra note 7. A "taking" can be effectuated pursuant to the "Implied Con-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7
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public by at lea.t two Presidential Administrations and the applicable
federal agencies, it can reasonably be said that experimentation with
and utilization of the supersonic transport does constitute a "public
purpose."2 Its sonic boom also would fall within the purview of
the constitutional language.
Confusion .has been great from the standpoint of the claimant,
who on several occasions has alleged a "taking" in situations where
mere incidental damage has been found. In one case, 21 the Department
of Agriculture was requested by a railroad station to spray and disinfect sweet potatoes. In so doing, a fire broke out causing destruction
to the station, processing machine and sweet potatoes. In rejecting
the claimants' argument that since spraying itself was a public purpose
the appropriation in connection therewith was also a public purpose,
the court stated:
This argument is not sound because it fails to reckon a distinction
between the destruction and damaging of private property by
agents of the State while engaged merely in performance of a
tact" theory. Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918) ; United States v. A
Certain Tract or Parcel of Land, 44 F. Supp. 712 (D. Ga. 1942) ; see Note, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 275 (1960); LOCKHART, KAMISAR, CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
517-528 (1967). As to what constitutes a "public purpose" - see generally LEFCOE,
LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 1066 (1966) ; see also Nagle v. Caddo Parrish, 175 La.
705, 144 So. 425 (1932); Booth v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 171 La. 1096, 133
So. 169 (1931) ; DeMoss v. Bossier Parrish, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1938) ; Green
v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 1963 La. 117, 111 So. 619 (1927) ; Pelt v. Louisiana State Livestock Sanitary Bd., 178 So. 644 (La. App. 1938) ; Cope v. Louisiana State Livestock
Sanitary Bd., 176 So. 657 (La. App. 1937); Murff v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n.,
140 So. 863 (La. App. 1932).
20. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations have proposed continued
monetary authorizations for development of two Supersonic Transport prototypes.
In the fiscal year 1971, President Nixon proposed $290. million for this purpose.
On May 27, 1970, the House of Representatives approved and sent to the Senate
a bill which would facilitate such development. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1970, at 1,
col. 5. SST proponents in the Nixon Administration have cited the following public
purposes supporting its development: 1) The aircraft industry, being a dynamic and
essential ingredient in our total economy, would provide an abundance of jobs pursuant
to a successful SST program; 2) an appreciable salutary effect would be effected
upon our balance of payments and general economy; 3) development is necessary if
the United States is to maintain its leadership role in the field of navigation. N.Y.
Times, September 29, 1969, at 91, col. 1. Congressional supporters of Nixon Administration policy in this regard are concerned that a failure to proceed with development might relegate the U.S. to a second-class position in world aviation. Moreover,
they cite the overwhelming convenience for United States citizens which would be
inherent in the SST. It is designed to carry up to 300 passengers at nearly three
times the speed of sound. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
The Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration in
particular, without strong opposition from either the Department of the Interior or
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has pressed forcefully for continued development of the SST. They put forth the favorable effects upon this
country's balance of payments and international prestige as the primary arguments in
favor of SST development. U.S. News & World Rep., May 25, 1970, at 70. William
M. Magruder, who has been named to head the supersonic transport program within
the F.A.A., has lobbied intensely for Congressional authorization on grounds stated
above. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1970, at 44, col. 3. See: U.S. News & World Rep., May
25, 1970, at 70.
21. Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948).
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governmental function and the deliberate taking or necessary
damaging of property for the public use or benefit. In the first
instance, the destruction or damage occurs not for a public purpose
but by reason of the negligence of state officers or agents. In the
latter, the property is taken or damaged under the power of
eminent domain; it is an appropriation for public purposes for
which adequate compensation is guaranteed
to the owner by
22
Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution.
Thus, the mere fact that damage occurs while a governmental agency
i§ involved in work or in a program for an alleged "public purpose"
is not enough. If damage arises from a negligent act or an incident
wholly disconnected from the object of the governmental program, then
there can be no recovery on the theory that there "was a taking for
a public purpose for which due compensation should be made." However, with regard to sonic boom, where damage is generally foreseeable
as an adjunct to such experimentation or undertaking, the logical
conclusion seems to be that "inverse condemnation" should be an
efficacious cause of action.
SONIC Boom

Technical Aspects
Sonic boom has been defined as "a mechanical phenomenon of
the air, composed of pressure waves and sound waves, generated by
an object moving through the air at supersonic speeds."21 8 In other
words, it occurs in tandem with an aircraft travelling through the air
at a velocity equalling or exceeding the speed of sound. At such times
pressure waves are generated resulting in a release of energy which
ultimately creates the loud sound that has become its characteristic
trademark. The intensity of the sonic boom at ground level will vary
with the mass, speed, acceleration, and altitude of the aircraft; as well
as with the angle of attack, maneuvers, turbulence, and configuration
of the terrain. As the size, weight, and speed of the aircraft increase,
there is a marked gain in the impact and extent of the sonic boom.
Since sonic boom is a 760 mile per hour mass of compressed energy,
it can cause destruction in its immediate path equivalent to the force
of an atomic explosion at ground zero. 24 Its audibility in an area ten
miles wide at ground level is unavoidable in flights at supersonic
velocities at proposed altitudes.25
22. Id. at 1078, 34 So. 2d at 323-24.
23. Hammon An Old and A New Legal Problem: Defining "Explosion" and
"Sonic Boom", 45 A.B.A.J. 696, 699 (1959) (italics omitted).
24. 12 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Sonic Boom 593 (1962).
25. UDALL REPORT, supra note 1 at 10.
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The attainment of supersonic speed causes the creation of two
sonic booms that are separated by approximately .2 to .3 seconds.
One of these emanates from pressure waves arising at the front of
the aircraft and the other from those arising at the tail, i.e., a bow
shock and a tail shock that spread over the earth's surface in the same
direction as the vehicle. Moreover, the N-wave shock pattern on the
ground is the result of the creation of such overpressure and under26
pressure.
Sound reaches the listener after the aircraft has passed. This fact,
coupled with great speed and the high altitude of the aircraft, makes
visual observation of the object most difficultY
The "cutoff Mach number" is critical in measuring the point
below which the shock wave will not reach the ground. If the speed
of sound is represented when the Mach number is 1.0, as the Mach
number increases the severity of boom impact on the ground shall
increase, while no perceptible boom will occur where the Mach number
is below 1.0. Utilizing data compiled at 36,000 feet, it can be seen
that a greater boom effect will result due to a supersonic descent. In
that situation, the cutoff point will be lower than otherwise.2"
Any form of aircraft acceleration - lateral, longitudinal, or
normal - can cause extreme "focusing" of the sonic boom. "Focusing"
causes what are known as "superbooms." For example, SST's, at
weights of up to 250 tons, require certain degrees of lift in order to
maintain a cruise flight. Such maneuvering is effectuated by slightly
increasing the knife-edge aspect of the half-acre wing area. Such an
increase in wing aspect at Mach 3 (1800 mph) would result in
massive stacking of air molecules which in turn would result in
tremendous pressure on the earth's surface. It would be far in excess
of that caused by lightweight, negligible lift supersonic fighters. Therefore, the newly advocated and potentially sophisticated SST presents
even more significant problems than those associated with ordinary,
less powerful supersonic aircraft. 09
Technological data currently indicates that the SST will produce
a "nominal" boom of 2.5 pounds per square foot over water. "Focusing" effects may cause it to reach 5-6 pounds per square foot. Conse26. Ortner, Sonic Boom: Containment or Confrontation, 34 J. AI L. & Com. 208,
210 (1968).
27. Apothaker, The Air Force, the Navy and Sonic Boom, 46 A.B.A.J. 987
(1960). See UDALL REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-22. This report presents a very

technical description of the scientific and technological characteristics of the sonic
boom. For brevity, a lengthy discussion will be omitted.
28. Ortner, supra note 26, at 211.
29. It is contemplated that the U. S. SST will reach speeds equivalent to
Machby 3Villanova
and willUniversity
probablyCharles
cruiseWidger
at 60,000
rather
80,000
feet. Id.
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quently, the potential for damage has been found to have increased in
areas over water as well as over land.30
Effects of Sonic Boom on People

Supersonic flight presents a myriad of problems because of its
ability, even at high altitudes, to create new noise corridors on the
ground tens of miles wide."' Since these corridors trace the aircraft's
flight path, and since these need not be permanent paths, no land
area would be free from some potential noise intrusion. Thus, if

we are to permit the SST to fly in a ramous fashion over the United
States, we must expect that the frequency and intensity of the sonic
boom would cause a large increase in both the noise level, and the
number of people exposed to such noise.
It is expected that by 1975 20 to 40 million people under a 1234
mile wide path on either side of expected flight tracks would be
subjected to 5 to 50 sonic booms per day. Each such boom would be
the equivalent in terms of decibel levels to the noise produced by a
large truck traveling at 60 m.p.h. at a distance of approximately
30 feet, or produced by a four-engine turbo-fan jet airplane within
one-half mile of its take-off point. An additional 35 to 65 million
people within 12Y2 to 25 miles of the flight path would be subjected to
1 to 50 sonic booms per day of somewhat lower intensity, and 13 to 25
million more would experience 1 to 4 high-intensity booms. 2
Persons experiencing sonic booms are startled and sometimes
diverted or, if asleep, may be abruptly and harshly awakened, as
would be the case if one were to suddenly hear an explosion. The
pulse rate may also increase along with other ephemeral and minor
changes in physiological body processes. However, there has been
no substantial evidence linking the effects of the sonic boom with bodily
physical harm. 3 Research has heretofore indicated that hearing cannot
be endangered or impaired by the sonic boom. It is questionable,
however, whether previous tests were calculated for sonic booms of the
magnitude that scientists now predict are possible, and whether prior
results can be extrapolated into situations involving much more
technologically advanced aircraft.
There have been no tests made on animals or on human beings
over sufficiently long periods of time in order to ascertain whether
30. Lundberg, The Boom Over the Sea, cited in 113 CONG. REc. 16654 (1967).

31. This is often referred to as a "boom carpet."
32. UDALL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.

33. According to data collected as of this date (1960), it can be said that direct

physical injury to an individual cannot be caused by a sonic boom. Apothaker, supra
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7
note 27, at 987.
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chronic effects can become prevalent. In addition, there has not in fact
been frequent or sustained supersonic flights over urban areas in this
country. There is, therefore, no way at this time to be certain of what
would constitute immediate interference with the well being of our
citizens from the point of view of their health. 4
It cannot be overemphasized that we are embarking upon an age
even more technologically advanced than that to which we have been
accustomed. Because sonic booms, for the most part, have been unobjectionable in the past, it cannot be assumed that they will so
continue to be.
In the case of subsonic jet-aircraft, where the noise level is high
only in the vicinity of airports, persons far from the airport sense
little noise from jet engines. Enterprises, such as schools or
hospitals where noise can seriously affect job performance, or
people who find the noise intolerably annoying and disruptive,
can move away. With commercial aircraft traveling at supersonic
speeds on all profitable routes in the United States, blanketing
a large share of the United States with repeated booms, there
would be virtually no "away" to move to. Many of us have
come to tolerate, though grudgingly, aircraft noise, will we also
come to accept the sonic boom ?3

Notwithstanding that actual physical damage resulting from the
effects of the sonic boom is a matter of conjecture, a large percentage
of the public polled during tests conducted in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
in 1964, believed that the sonic boom causes structural damage.3 6
Scientists, geologists and various other experts have recently experimented and compiled data in the hopes of finding substantive answers
to this perplexing problem. For the most part, opinions have differed
and no final conclusions have been obtained. Nonetheless, while it can
be said that resolutions or determinations must necessarily rest upon
numerous variables or factors existing at a given moment, a few
general results have been observed. Window and plate glass can be
broken and, as a result, adjacent property such as draperies, can also
be damaged. Light bric-a-brac may be shaken from shelves and broken.
Damage to loosely latched doors can occur, as can further damage
to already defective plaster. Structural damage to foundations, floors,
load-bearing walls, etc. cannot be caused by sonic boom.87
34. See generally UDALL REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-34.
35. Id. at 10. See Roth, Sonic Boom: A Definition and Some Legal Implications,
25 J. AIR L. & CoM. 68 (1958).
36. SANDS, SONIc BOOM RESEARCH, at 4 (1958-1968) (unpublished research compiled for the Federal Aviation Administration) (1968).
Apothaker,
supra
note Widger
27, at School
987. "Because
of atmospheric
conditions, wind,
Published by37.
Villanova
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Charles
of Law Digital
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temperature, and other variables, a sonic boom caused by aircraft supersonic flight
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Research and Testing Data
In 1960, tests involving twenty-five flights at Mach 1.09 to 1.12
resulted in no glass breakage for sonic boom levels from 0 to 20.0
pounds per square foot (psf). However, there were 2.4 possible breakages of small and colonial residence-type windows. Fifty-one breakages occurred within the pressure range of 20.0 to 100.0 psf. 8
During 1961-1962, an experimental program in St. Louis,
Missouri, concluded that overpressures of 2.6 psf were not of sufficient
magnitude to cause damage to sound plaster and to cause good quality
glass to break. 9
In tests conducted in New Mexico from November, 1964, to
February, 1965, the overpressure range utilized was from 2.0 psf
through 28.0 psf with a flight frequency of 30 per day. Observations
were similar to those preceding it. Thus, it corroborated conclusions
reached earlier. However, certain damage did arise at higher levels
of pressure. 0 This indicated that in some circumstances sonic booms
of greater magnitude will have a causal relationship to extensive
property damage. This presumes, of course, that "focusing" or
"superbooms" will occur.
Proving a Causal Relationship
During the period from February 3, 1964 to July 30, 1964, the
Federal Aviation Agency conducted a sonic boom testing program
over Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. As a result thereof, several lawsuits
were initated against the United States seeking redress for damages
sustained.4 ' A number of legal theories were relied upon for relief.
However -the significant question raised in all of the suits was whether
a causal relationship could be demonstrated. In other words, individual
claimant property owners had an exceedingly difficult time proving
that sonic booms were the direct cause of the alleged damage.42 Thus,
may be weaker or stronger than is normally expected. Not many experiments have
been conducted or standards established so that it is impossible to tell exactly at

what height and under what conditions a sonic boom will cause glass damage. All one
can honestly say is that it will do so." Id. at 988 n.10; See also Hammon, supra
note 23.
38. Sands, supra note 36, at 2.

39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 6-7.
41. For a review of all the cases arising from the Oklahoma testing see FAA,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF NOISE ABATEMENT, SONIC BooM PROGRAMS STAFF

REPORT ON

SONIC

BooM

LITIGATION,

at 1 (Dec. 1968).

(hereinafter

cited as Sonic Boom Litigation).
42. Interview with George Foster, Associate Counsel, Chief Litigation Division,
Federal Aviation Administration, in Washington, D. C., December 5, 1968. While
relationship was proven-was rejected,

the Government's contentions-that no causal
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7
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the apparent difficulties encountered at that time evidence further our
need for more substantive observations in this regard.
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF RELIEF

The substantive area of the law covered by the general contents
of this article is by no means indicative of the kind of proceeding most
often brought by an oppressed landowner.4" Rather, depending upon
the factual setting, the proper act-ion may be one in equity for injunctive relief; in -tort for negligence;44 in tort for absolute liability;
in trespass for nuisance ;41 or pursuant to statute, act, 46 or state
constitution.

47

48
With regard to injunctive relief, United States v. Causby,
indicated that an injunction for overhead flight was not proper because
the landowner owns only as much airspace as he can reasonably use.
Moreover, the great social utility of air traffic and the probability of
federal pre-emption of flight regulations have led courts to deny

injunctive relief in virtually all recent cases.49

Nuisance actions have been similarly unsuccessful primarily due
to the doctrine of "legalized nuisance" which in effect protects the
proper operation of certain publicly authorized facilities in the interest

of the general good.50 However, there have been cases which have
expert testimony presented made the cases very close in this regard, and it is felt
among the members of Mr. Foster's department that the question is still unresolved.
43. The large number of lawsuits brought as a result of the Oklahoma City testing
program ran the gamut of legal theories. In one such action, a landowner sued the
President of the United States. Thus, in Woodrow Bussey, et al. v. Lyndon Baines
Johnson, President, United States of America, (N.D. Okla. 1964), the complaint
alleged that Bussey and his daughter sustained profound mental and physical damages as a result of the booms and asked for money damages in the amount of
$101,250,000.00. A motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the defendant on the
grounds that the President was not subject to suit. Order of dismissal was entered
by the Court on August 15, 1964. See also Note, Airplane Noise, Property Rights,
and the Constitution,65 COLUM. L REv. 1428 (1965).
44. In Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948), the proper action
was said to be one for negligence.
45. Nuisance cases have already forced a re-examination of the servitude origins
of overflight liability; See Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex.
1960); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960);
Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960).
46. Claims against the Air Force or Navy for damages as a result of sonic boom
damages are cognizable pursuant to the Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733
(1968), implemented by Air Force Reg. 112-3 and Navy Gen. Claims Regs., Appendix
1, 1955 Naval Supp. to the Manual for Cts. Martial, 1951. The judicial remedy of
suing in the appropriate federal court exists under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1966). However, the administrative provisions of the F.T.C.A.,
28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1966), are not deemed applicable to sonic boom claims.
47. See generally UDALL REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-48.

48. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
49. See generally Note, supra note 43, at 1433-34.
50. UDALL REPORT, supra note 1, at 46. See also Tondel, Noise Litigation at
Public Airports, 32 J. AiR L. & CoM. 387, 397 (1966).
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found that a nuisance could ripen into a "taking,"'" thus permitting
an inverse condemnation cause of action.
DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW: INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Supreme Court
An augury of things to come with regard to eventual litigation
under the inverse condemnation theory appeared in the 1920's. In
PortsmouthHarborLand & Hotel Co. v. United States,52 the plaintiffs
alleged that the United States had continuously discharged its battery
over the claimants' land. Additionally, it was alleged that a "taking"
had been effectuated thereby and that damages should be forthcoming.
Overruling a demurrer granted in the court below, the Supreme Court
held -that there was a taking of a servitude, and that an implied
contract to pay might be inferred. The Court went on to say that
where acts amount to a taking of property by the United States, without
an assertion of an adverse right, a contract to pay may be implied
whether contemplated by the parties or not.
Close analysis of that decision indicates that the Court was satisfied
to leave future controversies to be decided in their own technological
context and was unwilling to dogmatize or to pronounce guidelines
for general applicability. It also apparently decided to abstain from
constitutional interpretation and to retreat from a discussion of the
principles of eminent domain. Rather, the Court was seemingly willing
to rest its determination solely on common law property concepts and
the "implied contract" theory.
In adopting a flexible standard in 1946, the Supreme Court, in
Causby, recognized what it felt to be the realities of the day and
presaged the eventual direction of our country's technological development. For during this period, we were moving from a relatively
agrarian and ruralistic society to a populistic and urbanistic one. In
addition, we had passed through the trauma of a depression and World
War II, and were ready for economic expansion and scientific advancement. In particular, the period saw the first real proliferation of
air transportation.
United States v. Causby53 has not only become the bellwether
for current opinions, but in this writer's opinion, has provided the
foundation for "inverse condemnation" theory as applied to damage
from aircraft. Thus, it is essential to examine the case closely.
51. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
52. 260 U.S. 327 (1922).

53. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7
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The appellants owned a home and a chicken farm located near a
municipal airport which was being used by various military aircraft.
The planes landing and taking off therefrom frequently came so close
to the claimants' property - barely missing the aforesaid structures that they caused startling noise and acute illumination from their
glaring landing lights. As a result the property could no longer be
used as a chicken farm. Furthermore, the landowners lost sleep, and
became nervous and frightened. An action was brought in the Court
of Claims to recover damages for an alleged taking of property.5 4 The
Court of Claims found that the Government had taken an easement
over the claimants' property, and awarded damages. However, it made
no finding as to the precise nature or duration of such easement.
After an appeal by the federal government, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.""
The Supreme Court was confronted with problems posed by the
Air Commerce Act which had legislatively changed property rights in
the air over one's land. The Court noted that the utilization of airspace
immediately above one's land, while perhaps not completely destroying
enjoyment and usage of the land, would limit utility and cause a
reduction in its value.56 In reversing and remanding the case because
of a failure of the lower court to determine whether the easement taken
was temporary or permanent, the Court went on to espouse a doctrine
which still has firm roots in the existing law:
The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the
inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable under
the Fifth Amendment. The airspace, apart from the immediate
reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. We need not
determine at this time what those precise limits are. Flights over
private land are not a taking unless they are so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land.5 7
The Court reiterated a former theory by indicating that the
character of the invasion is the pertinent factor, not the amount of
physical damage emanating therefrom. Moreover, it recognized that
54. Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. CI. 1945). The United States
relied upon the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 49 U.S.C. § 171 (1952) as amended by
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 401 (1952).
55. 327 U.S. 775 (1945).
56. The court recognized this to be the philosophy of Portsmouth Harbor Land
Hotel & Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
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if land owners were unable to use their land for any purpose, their
loss, ipso facto, would be complete."'
The Justices were aware of the consequences due to -the normal
use of aircraft in navigable airspace. They also recognized that,
generally, noncompensable damages flow from such use. However,
it was felt that the facts here did not unequivocally indicate that the
approach flights were in the navigable airspace, notwithstanding the
approval of the glide paths in question by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority. Most importantly, the Court agreed that a landowner
owns at least as much of the land as he can reasonably occupy or use
in connection with his proper use of the surface.
A year later the Supreme Court solidified its position by indicating
that property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are
made upon an owner's normal use of his land to an extent that a
servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in the course of
time."9 Subsequently, it suggested that merely because Congress defined
"navigable airspace" to include necessary space for take-off and landing,
a property owner was not necessarily precluded from a condemnation
action based upon a taking by low flying aircraft, although the taking
occurred in navigable airspace. 60
Lower Federal Courts
Throughout the entire line of cases dealing with the theory of
"inverse condemnation"'" and particularly with the problem of whether
58. "It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface
of the land and taken exclusive possession of it." Id. at 261.
59. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947).
60. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Reh. denied April 16,
1962, 369 U.S. 857. This case came from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: 402
Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961). The problem is presented only in the case of a
taking caused by the noise of privately-owned civil aircraft, operating to or from a
privately-owned (or municipally-owned) civil airport, and controlled by a government control tower.
61. "Inverse condemnation" has been frequently used since Causby to obtain
rdress for diminutions of property values caused by aircraft noise. See Aaron v.
United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963) ; Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580
(10th Cir. 1962) ; Sensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1962) ; Bacon v.
United States, 295 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ; Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931
(Ct. Cl. 1961) ; Wright v. United States, 279 F.2d 517 (Ct. Cl. 1960) ; Hopkins v.
United States, 173 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Tex. 1959) ; Pope v. United States, 173
F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959) ; Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl.
1959); Dick v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 491 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Adaman Mut.
Water Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 658 (1958) ; Herring v. United States,
162 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ; Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp.
597 (Ct. Cf. 1958) ; Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664
(1960); Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955); Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961) rev'd 369 U.S. 84 (1962)
Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963);
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) ; Trippe v. Port of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7
New York Authority, 17 App. Div. 2d 472, 236 N.Y.S. 2d 312 (1962).
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there has been a "taking," it is clear that the landowner cannot raise
these arguments if the alleged "takings" have occurred prior to his
inhabiting the land in question. 2 Also, when acts complained of are
performed by the federal government, the claimant must look to the
federal constitution for relief and not to state constitutional provisions.
Therefore, it has been stated in one United States Court of Appeals
decision:
But the acts complained of here were performed by the federal
government and the liability, if any imposed, is by virtue of the
federal constitution, and state notions of constitutional liability
are relevant only insofar as they may be persuasive in the judicial
process. Moreover, it should be noted that, unlike many state
constitutions, the federal constitution provides only for the payment
of just compensation for a taking of private property for public
use, and damages to property not taken are compensable only as
a consequence of or incidental to an actual taking.6"
Using this approach, the court held that a single destructive act without
a deliberate intent to assert or acquire a proprietary interest or dominion
is not a compensable taking. 64 Instead it would be characterized as a
tortious act and would consequently fall within the purview of sovereign
65
immunity.
The above mentioned rule was augmented one year later in a case
germane to the problem at hand.66 There, the United States, through
its executive agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, performed experiments with atomic energy and nuclear detonations about 150 miles
from the claimants' ranch. In concluding that there was no "taking"
62. See e.g., Highland Park v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597, 600 (Ct. Cl.
1958) held that if the defendant had an easement before the plaintiff acquired the
property, there has been no taking; see also Avery v. United States, 360 F.2d 640

(Ct. Cl. 1964).
63. Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir. 1953) (emphasis
added). While the appellants in this case were invoking the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution to impose liability without fault for the damage complained of, they cited and relied upon Oklahoma cases construing the Oklahoma
Constitution which prohibits the taking or damaging of private property for public
use without payment of just compensation.
64. Id. at 767. The court cited for its authority: United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) on remand, Causby v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 262 (Ct. Cl. 1948);
Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922)
Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 125 (1922); Peabody
v. United States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913); Beford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217
(1903).
65. For the most part, the federal courts have followed an extremely uneven
course in trying to distinguish between tortious activity and the imposition of a
servitude for which the Constitution implies a promise to justly compensate. See
Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765, 767, (10th Cir. 1953). In this regard it
can be said that no clear cut trend has emerged.
66. Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
This line of cases is discussed in Comment, Federal Liability for Sonic Boom Damage, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 274 (1958).
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in the constitutional sense, the court, using Supreme Court language, said:
Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are

made upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between
private parties, a servitude has been acquired by agreement or in
the course of time ..... It is the intent of the party, who, it is
claimed has asserted a proprietary interest which is the determining factor. This intent may be manifested by a single deliberate
act or it may be inferred by continuous or repeated acts, but a
single isolated and unintentional act of the United States resulting in damage or destruction of property is not a taking in the
constitutional sense."7
The federal courts, in situations Where a federal regulation provides for navigable airspace below as well as above 1000 feet, generally
hold that such flights cannot constitute a "taking."6 But, as we have
seen thus far, they have had a great deal of difficulty in some cases,
within the Causby framework, articulating whether, or at what point
in time, there has been a "taking." In Bacon v. United States, 9 the
67. 135 F. Supp. at 654. This case deals with the Nevada Proving Grounds tests
which ran from October 22 to November 5, 1951. Detonations caused blast waves
and air shock waves which could reach into and bounce or rebound from atmospheric
layer elevations and surround the earth. Shock waves are capable of erratic behavior
and at the times of the tests they could not be completely controlled. In part, the
plaintiff alleged that the United States intentionally took and acquired the right and
privilege to shake and damage his property as an unavoidable result of its intentionally
detonating of atomic bombs; that this action was a taking for public use within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is therefore
compensable. Although Harris was used as authority for this proposition, the court
here broadened the theory of "deliberate intent". Moreover, it appeared not to
totally preclude a single act from constituting a taking. Thus, this seems pertinent
in light of current supersonic transport testing programs; Harris was an action for
crop damages sustained by adjoining landowners as a result of spraying operations
conducted by the U. S. Government on its own property. The Court of Appeals
held that where the government's spraying of herbicide on its own lands occurred
only once, and further spraying was not anticipated in the foreseeable future, the
alleged injury to crops on adjoining lands did not amount to a taking of property
in the Constitutional sense, but rather constituted a tortious act for which the government was only consensually liable. This is significant when it is considered that
further supersonic testing and utilization is anticipated and foreseeable.
68. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (1956). While holding
that there was no "taking," this court noted that the operation of the aircraft, in
landing and taking off, occurred at altitudes from 450 feet upward to 1500 feet, with
a majority of flights above 1,000 feet, and that the aircraft did not operate continually over the complaining village but only under particular weather conditions,
making it impossible to be precise as to the number of flights over the village at any
specific altitude. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1961).
69. 295 F2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Plaintiffs herein sued for the value of the
interest in said properties, allegedly taken as a result of aircrafts operating at Turner
Air Force Base. B-25's made numerous flights at elevations as low as approximately
250-300 feet over all of plaintiffs' land; others flew as low as 100-150 feet. The
Government defended on' the basis that any cause of action accrued in 1941 and
certainly no later than 1948-1949 when regular, low flights occurred over the land
in question. Therefore, it was reasoned that the action should be barred by the
statute of limitations. The issue presented was when did flights over the plaintiffs'
lands amount to a taking under the standard established by the Causby decision.
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Court of Claims, relying upon Causby, found that while there was
some noise and inconvenience to the plaintiffs from the time the
flights commenced in 1941, it was not so obnoxious as to be intolerable,
and from 1947 to 1955 the effects of such flights were not such as to
interfere substantially with the residential use of the plaintiffs' properties. It then went on to say:
It was not until late in 1954 or early in 1955 when the F-84F, a
swept-wing aircraft, was introduced at the Base that the noise
became intolerable to the plaintiffs. The noise created by the
F-84F was different from the previous aircraft used in that it
emitted a shrill, high-pitched, intense noise, terrifying to the
plaintiffs. Furthermore, a number of KB29's were brought to
the Base at the same time and they also made a very loud, and
what was to plaintiffs, a terrifying noise as they flew over
70
plaintiffs' properties.
As with that portion cited above, the court throughout the opinion
had difficulty in determining both the fact and/or time of taking.7'
While it gave the impression that several factors were instrumental
in the determination that there had been a "taking" at this time as
opposed to some time in the past, in fact, the advent of the F-84F
was the only determinative factor in the decision.7"
What is most surprising about this particular analysis was the
relative ease with which the judges collated the various flights and
the noise that each produced. In retrospect, it was not difficult for
them to evaluate the forcefulness, irritability and obnoxiousness of each
sound. Obviously, the noise emitted from the F-84F was of greater
magnitude than the less sophisticated and less powerful aircraft that
preceded it. But, what if that action were maintained in 1948 before
the advent of the F-84F: Would the court have denied recovery?7"
70. 295 F.2d at 938 (emphasis added).
71. It seems that this case points out an inherent difficulty of the Causby standard, in determining whether or when a taking has occurred.
72. The court did not dwell on the repeated occurrences versus isolated occurrence dichotomy. It merely was trying to find if there was direct and immediate
interference.
73. See Haar, Airport Noise and the Urban Dweller: A Proposed Solution, THE
APPRAISAL J. 551, 554 (Oct. 1968).

Condemnation claims are subject to defending limitations, but in such a

dynamic situation how should the period be measured? Assuming the complainants' use was prior to the airport, it may be argued that the limitation period
commenced when the airport began operating. The question has real bite because
the original airport activity may annoy owners of neighboring residences but
not to a degree which impels them to seek relief.

A related question - greater noise because of increased activity by the same
type of aircraft - is still largely open, arising in issues involving the statute, of
limitations. Here courts have gone both ways. Some hold that once the airport

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 7
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15 : p. 887

Who is to say that 13 years from now, the sonic boom will or will
not be considered obnoxious compared to the innovations of that day.74
Should we now compare the sonic boom with the noise that is produced
by the F-84F?

In 1962 in Batten v. United States" the question was raised in
federal court as to whether a taking of property, compensable under

the Fifth Amendment, could occur when there is no physical invasion
of the affected property. Instead, in this case, the operation and
maintenance of military jet aircraft on a United States Air Force Base
produced noise, vibration, and -smoke7" which interfered with the use

and enjoyment of the land. In a most significant opinion, the court
held that there could not be a "taking ' 7 primarily because there was
no physical invasion. 8 In essence the court held that there could be no
liability imposed on the United States for noise, smoke, and vibration
without physical invasion by direct overflight. 7 The court went on
to say:
The vibrations which cause the windows and dishes to rattle,
the smoke which blows into the homes during the summer months
when the wind is from the east, and the noise which interrupts

ordinary home activities do interfere with the use and enjoyment
by the plaintiffs of their properties. Such interference is not a
taking. The damages are no more than a consequence of the
operations of the Base and as said in United States v. Willow
River Power Co. they "may be compensated by legislative authority, not by force of the Constitution alone." As we see the case
has begun operations, property owners are given notice not only of existing
activity, but of greater future activity. Other decisions, at least implicitly, would
not place any duty of foresight on property owners.
74. "But no court has yet been confronted with the question of whether the
property owner, having recovered for interference caused by airport activity, may
thereafter recover a second and perhaps third or fourth time for more interference
where the cause is more aircraft of the same type." Id. at 554.
75. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
76. The Batten court, in speaking of the repercussions flowing from the utilization
of aircraft, stated that:
The mentioned activities produce sound and shock waves which cross the
plaintiffs' properties and limit the use and enjoyment thereof. Strong vibrations
cause windows and dishes to rattle. Loud noises frequently made conversation
and the use of telephone, radio, and television facilities impossible and also
interrupt sleep. 306 F. 2d at 582.
77. In discussing the meaning of the word "taking", the court relied on United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945), where it was said that
governmental action short of occupancy was a "taking" if "its effects are so complete
as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter."
78. Recovery has been allowed in the following cases because there was a
physical invasion: Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ; Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ; Herring v. United
States, 162 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
79. The noise and disturbances caused here were felt by the court to be mere
neighborhood inconveniences. 306 F.2d at 585.
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at bar, the distinctions which the Supreme Court has consistently
made between0 "damages" and "taking" control and compel denial
of recovery.8
Thus, in effect, the court required almost "total destruction" of the
property interest. 8 '
State Courts
While some federal district courts have taken the position that
repeated flights nearby, but not directly overhead, must be endured as
mere "damages" which for various reasons may not 'be compensable,'
the state courts have generally been much more lenient in this regard.
8
the court felt it was for the jury
In Thornburg v. Port of Portland,
to decide whether systematic flights directly over or adjacent to
private land, even though all flights were above the prescribed 500 foot
altitude 4 constituted a noise nuisance that was substantial enough to
result in a "taking." In not requiring physical invasion, and finding
a taking where substantial diminution in property interest has occurred,
the court agreed with Justice Murrah's dissent in Batten. Moreover,
according to this court it was felt that the majority view -in Batten
80. 306 F.2d at 585. In United States v. Willow River Power Company, 324
U.S. 499, 510 (1945), the Supreme Court stated that: "Damage alone gives courts no
power to require compensation."
Also preserving the dichotomy of "damage," and "taking" is Nunnally v. United
States, 239 F.2d 521 (1956). See generally Gasiewiez, Aviation Easements, 8 A.F.
JAG L. REV. 38 (1966).

81. Justice Murrah, dissenting, however objected to such a requirement, asserting
that a "taking" should only require substantial diminution, and not total destruction
of the property interest. 306 F.2d at 587.
82. Two cases following this reasoning are: Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp.
399 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okl.
1958).
83. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). This was an "inverse condemnation" action
brought by property owners against the owner and operator of an airport. From
an adverse judgment below, the property owners appealed. The Port of Oakland
owns and operates the Portland International Airport. Having the power of eminent
domain, it had acquired property surrounding the airport but had stopped short of
the complainants' lands. The complainants alleged that there has been a "taking"
in that noise from jets make their land unusable. The theories relied upon are: 1)
Systematic flights directly over their land cause a substantial interference with use
and enjoyment. Such an interference constitutes a nuisance. Such continuing nuisance,
when maintained by the Government, amounts to the taking of an easement, or
at least presents a jury question as to whether there is a taking; 2) Systematic
flights, while not directly overhead, create a taking for the same reasons as above.
The respondents contend that their planes were flying in the public domain, i.e.,
within the navigable airspace as defined by Federal law, and that there was no
interference with any legally protected interest of the appellants and thus no taking
for which compensation should be forthcoming.
84. The Thornburg decision strongly indicates that a property owner has a valid
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probably turned on considerations of public policy, i.e., that private
rights must yield to public convenience in this class of cases.8 5
Martin v. Port of Seattles0 also rejected Batten. As stated in a
recent periodical:

The trend today appears to reject Batten and accept a more liberal
approach to granting relief in cases where there has been no
direct overflight, but where noise and disturbance is of such a
degree as to constitute a taking."
The Florida state court of appeals, in accepting the legal theory
of "inverse condemnation," has recognized that noise interference
alone may ripen into a nuisance which in turn could ripen into a
taking. The court relied on Thornburg in reaching its decision. 8
REQUIREMENT

OF A

GOVERNMENTAL

DEFENDANT

In "inverse condemnation" actions courts are generally moving
beyond the traditional "zones" of litigation - those areas adjacent
to airports or within glide paths or approaches thereto. However,
while such a zone is expanding, it 'has not yet reached areas any great
distance away from a municipal or government airport's provincial
legal domain.89
There has also been a discernible broadening of the concept of
the "proper party in interest." For example, in Ackerman v. Port of
Seattle,90 the court held that the continuing and frequent low flights
over the claimants' land constituted a "taking" of an easement for the
purpose of flying airplanes over the land. It then had to decide
whether the Port of Seattle, which operated no planes, could be held
liable for the alleged "taking." It said:
. . . the liability of the Port . . . is predicated on the Port's

alleged failure to provide adequate facilities, necessitating the frequent low flights over the appellants' land. Having the power
85.
86.
87.
88.

233 Ore. at 182.
64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 cert. denied, 374 U.S. 989 (1964).
See Note, supra note 4, at 173.
This court also said:
Since U. S. v. Causby .. ., and particularly since Griggs v. Allegheny County
we know that easements can be taken by repeated low-level flights over private
land. Such easements have been found-in actions against the federal government
(Causby) and in actions against municipal corporation (Griggs). When such
easements are said to have been taken, compensation must be paid to the owners
of the land thus burdened.
City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95. 99 (Fla. 1964).
89. We are speaking here of that zone within which a governmental entity can
be sued for having performed a "taking".
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7

90. 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
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to acquire an approach way by condemnation, the Port allegedly
failed to exercise that power, with the result that the appellants'
private airspace is allegedly being used as an approach way, without just compensation first having been paid to them ....

There-

fore, we conclude that in the instant case the appellants have not
only successfully pleaded an unconstitutional taking, but further,
they have alleged such a taking by the Port."
Following and augmenting the Ackerman decision, the Supreme
Court handed down an opinion in the case of Griggs v. Allegheny

County.92 There the Court imposed liability for an invasion of airspace

upon the -condemning authority operating the airport rather than upon
the federal government or airline companies actually operating the
planes. In so doing, the Court stated:
It 'is argued that though there was a "taking," someone other
than respondent was the taker - the airlines or the C.A.A. acting
as an authorized representative of the United States. We think,
however, that respondent, which was the promoter, owner, and
lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances the one who took
the air easement in the constitutional sense.9
Justice Black, joined by Justice Frankfurter, argued, in dissent, that
the federal government, not the county, had taken airspace over the
claimants' property. The underlying rationale, therefore, was that
since the federal government was the entity which appropriated the
airspace easement, it should consequently be held liable for the diminution in property value. The majority of the Court in deciding that the
federal government was not the taker, went on to say that:
Respondent decided, subject to the approval of the C.A.A., where
the airport would 'be built, what runways it would need, their
direction and length, and what land and navigational easements
would be needed. The federal government takes nothing; it is
the local authority which decides to build an airport vel non, and
where it is to be located. ..

.

However, in Wright v. United States,9 5 a circuit court of appeals
indicated that the United States Government was liable for acts of a
91. 55 Wash. 2d at 413, 348 P.2d at 671; accord, Martin v. Port of Seattle,
supra note 87.
92. 369 U.S. 84 (1962), Reh. denied 369 U.S. 857 (1962).
93. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).

94. Id. In Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960),
although the question was not presented, the court recognized that an owner of an
airport, having the power of eminent domain and the duty to provide adequate
facilities to carry out normal airport operations, could be liable for invasions of
legally protected interests of landowners.
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Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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state national guard unit since the facts indicated that the United
States had taken a flight easement, thus permitting the guard unit to
continue its use.
These decisions are particularly pertinent in forecasting the dispositions of future "inverse condemnation" proceedings.9" For, if we
say that the substantial amount of sonic boom damage occurs in areas
away from air stations, and that it is likely that commercial airlines
will initiate supersonic jet transport of passengers and cargo, it is
necessary to ascertain a governmental unit or body empowered to
effectuate a "taking" of property by eminent domain before7 any
"inverse condemnation" action can be successfully maintained.1
THE EFFECT OF SONIC BOOM ON THE THEORY OF
INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Within the framework of the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution, wherein the theory of "inverse condemnation" is
founded, the current posture of the law is somewhat unsettled. As to
whether or not there has been a "taking," two basic factors must be
considered: what kind of damage, and how great a degree.
First, pursuant to Causby, which is still good law, the Supreme
Court was not so much concerned about the dollar amounts of damage
or the actual physical manifestations as it was about the real effect
upon the complainants' use and quiet enjoyment of their land, as those
terms had been used in prior decisions relating to similar subject matter.
Thus, landowners would not be precluded from maintaining an action
in "inverse condemnation" so long as the essential elements of the
cause of action had been met.
The federal circuit court in Batten was similarly not influenced
by the manifold kinds or forms of damage the landowners had sustained. It would obviously be irrelevant whether an oppressed claimant
96. See generally Apothaker, supra note 27. With regard to military aircraft
and damage allegedly caused by a sonic boom, claims pursuant thereto are generally
administered under the Military Claims Act. Thus, if it is established that the damage was caused by an Air Force or Navy created sonic boom, the individual would
be reimbursed for the amount of his substantiated damages. However, Mr. Apothaker
points out:
Damage, within the meaning of the Military Claims Act, is interpreted to
mean actual "physical" damage. Claims for compensation for alleged "taking"
of property (navigation easement or depreciation in the value of the property)
resulting from jet operations in the airspace over private real property are not
considered cognizable under the provisions of the act. The position of the Department of Defense is that the settlement of such claims is a matter for the courts to
determine. Id. at 987 n.3. See also Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.
Supp. 597 (1958).

97. See generally UDALL REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7
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sustained glass damage, plaster cracks, or rattling and shaking of
small tangible items.
Unlike traditional factual situations, in "inverse condemnation"
litigation dealing with subsonic aircraft noise and its effects, supersonic
transports and their potential damages present many new problems
requiring judicial recognition and resolution. A typical problem is
harassment to the landowner in remote geographical areas. The
courts must now concern themselves with vast land masses between
airports and terminals, aircraft flying higher than permissible safe
altitudes, and sonic boom and other effects of at least equal or possibly
greater magnitude. Standards developed for subsonic transports flying
in similar areas at altitudes that would in no way interfere with the
use and enjoyment of land and would not be legally construed as
constituting a compensable "taking," must not control in the case of
the supersonic transport. For what could have been considered as a
safe altitude, for evidentiary purposes, prior to the SST, may now be
an extreme hazard to the landowner. Accordingly, most courts, while
they have not yet been confronted with regular supersonic flight situations on a commercial or military basis, have abandoned the requirement for liability that aircrafts be flying outside the navigable airspace
as delineated by federal regulatory agencies or other governmental
bodies. This effectively has eliminated the absolute defense of compliance with altitude requirements."
The Supreme Court, in Griggs, and state courts, as evidenced
by the Thornburg decision, have also liberalized the requirement that
there be a direct overflight above the plaintiff-landowner's property.
Instead, adjacent flights, which are by definition outside of the landowner's physical boundaries, can give rise to a proper "inverse condemnation" action. The court in Batten, however, obdurately adhered
to the necessity that there be a direct overflight. But, the SST was
not involved in that case, and the widespread physical repercussions
in terms of geographic area were therefore not in question.
The SST, although not flying directly over a claimant's property,
may through tremendous noise and vibration, fumes, and increased
traffic, deprive surrounding property owners of the use of their land.
Thus, although Batten has not been expressly overruled - these new
factual developments seem to be sufficient to reverse such myopic
98. State courts are generally more concerned with the damaging repercussions
that spring from the use of the aircraft than with the location of the plane. Specifically, courts in Washjngton, Oregon and Florida for example, do not exact the overflight requirement. In those states it suffices that the flights are low enough, whether
or not overhead, to interfere suk~tantially with the complainants' use and enjoyment
of property. See Martin v. Port of Seattle, supra note 86; Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, supra note 7; City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, supra note 7.
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1970], Art. 7

910

VILLANOVA

reliance upon direct overflights.

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15 : p. 887

Consequently, it is this writer's

opinion that future courts will argue, assuming the commercial or
military SST comes into being, that the supersonic transport is so
foreign to its antecedents, that it warrants a decided shift in position.9 9
Second, the Supreme Court, in Causby, took a most pragmatic
approach with regard to the degree of interference required. It was
willing to look closely at the facts at bar to determine whether they
constituted an immediate interference with the use and enjoyment
of the land. The state courts as well, by applying tests of "substantial
interference," deprivation of "use and enjoyment," "nuisance ripening
into a taking," etc., have come, with case by case analysis, to the
same result. Again, however, the Batten court assumed a position
of rigidity by demanding that there be such substantial interference
as to constitute almost a total despoliation of use.
It is submitted that the degree of interference created by the SST
will be considerable. The proposed United States SST, will be an
1800 mile-per-hour craft, with an average boom pressure of 2-2.5
pounds a square foot of pressure.'
Although recent test results have
indicated that widespread damage from the SST's sonic boom is not
imminent, even if the aircraft were to make repeated flights over
domestic land areas, it seems questionable whether supersonic aircraft
flying at Mach 3 speeds, or in excess thereof, will be similarly unharmful.'
In addition, since the strength of the boom will increase
when atmospheric conditions change and when the aircraft assumes
varying cruise and lift patterns, it is likely that ground effects will
intensify as well. Professor H. S. Ribner of the Institute for Aerospace Studies at the University of Toronto has said that "jet pilots,
by maneuvering at low altitudes could intensify the sonic boom by
up to 20 times."' 2 This was corroborated somewhat by the fact that
glass windows were recently broken by the sonic bang of low flying
Israeli and Syrian fighter planes.'
99. State courts have moved toward abolition of the stringent majority view
posited by Batten. There will undoubtedly be an escalation of case law before either
theory espoused in Batten will be firmly accepted or advanced, especially if widespread
usage of supersonic transport becomes a reality. But, if the nuisance theory is ultimately adopted across the board without the requirement that there be a physical
trespass, the original concepts advocates in Causby may be broadened to an extent
not anticipated by the courts.
100. N.Y. Times, February 4, 1970, at 86, col. 5. This "pressure" represents that
which is added to the existing pressure at sea level. See Wash. Post, April 27,
1969, at E-16, col. 1.
101. See generally Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise - The Aftermath of "Causby"
and "Griggs," 19 UNIv. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 31 (1964).

102. N.Y. Times, February 4, 1970, at 86, col. 5.
103. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1970, at 41.
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"While it is possible to describe sonic boom measurements in
terms of decibels, the figures would not be meaningful since acoustical
instrumentation calibrated to the decibel scale is not designed to
measure short duration pressure pulses."' 4 Nonetheless, it is generally conceded that noise levels emanating from the SST are intense
and extremely annoying. °5 For example, the same 1800 mile-perhour craft alluded to previously would create noise equivalent to that
made by a subsonic jet flying 100 feet overhead.'0 6 Moreover, the
swath, or noise configuration in terms of linear ground distance, as
mentioned before, 'is considerable.
Treatises and scientific journals have discussed the dichotomy
of "sonic boom" and "explosion" and of the difficulties of distinguishing between them. 10 7 On that basis, they have asserted that
through extrapolation the effects of sonic boom, like explosion, should
result in a "taking" within most of the legal doctrinal frameworks
heretofore suggested.
As Griggs and others in that line of cases strongly intimate, a
governmental entity can be delineated as that body which has constructively acquired property by eminent domain. For by authorizing
supersonic transport flights over land, appropriating funds therefor,
and by implementing the particular legislation giving rise thereto,
the federal government will become the proper party-defendant in
an action -in "inverse condemnation." Specifically, by allowing commercial airlines to introduce supersonic passenger planes, the regulatory measure providing therefor may be construed as being the
creation of an easement which can ripen into a "taking" of property
pursuant to the eminent domain clause of the United States Constitution.
Moreover, damage resulting from the sonic boom, being foreseeable,
would be wholly connected with the object and activity of the governmental program and would be at least an outgrowth of the regulatory
measure. Thus, "inverse condemnation" could be invoked successfully
by a private landowner as a basis for relief from damage caused by
sonic boom even though the aircraft in question are not governmentally
owned.
Ostensibly, production of the SST is being advocated by the
Nixon Administration on the basis that it will provide for a beneficial
104. Letter to Mr. Jerome N. Kline from Mr. John D. Demeter, Special Assistant
for the SST, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, February 6, 1970. (hereinafter cited as Demeter Letter).
105. See generally Hill, supra note 101.
106. N.Y. Times, February 4, 1970, at 86, col. 5.
107. See Hammon, supra note 23.
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public purpose. Specifically, three major arguments in favor of the
SST seem to predominate. First, it is thought that supersonic transport
will greatly stimulate economic growth. Second, it will provide incomparable convenience to individuals in their geographic mobility as well as to society in the movement of goods. Third, it will place
the United States firmly in international competition, thereby greatly
enhancing ,the materialistic prestige of our country.
In fact, the SST will be a boon to defense contractors, to the
airline industry, to manufacturers of constituent parts, and to big
business in general. Nonetheless, in the final analysis and within the
ambit of the Fifth Amendment, such development will be undoubtedly
for a "public purpose."
THE EFFECT OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION
OF THE

ON DEVELOPMENT

SST

The sonic boom, if it is to have a permanent presence in our
already strident society, will present even more unforeseeable problems
than those that have arisen to date with regard to noise, general
annoyance, and property damage. Perhaps it is best phrased as follows:
Studies of public reaction to aircraft and other extreme noises
in the United States, France and Britain, have consistently shown
that when frequency and intensity of noise exceed certain measureable indices, many people consider the noise so objectionable that
they resort to protest, to political pressures, to legal procedures and
to other active (and costly) measures in efforts to achieve relief.
Regular overland commercial flights of SST's over the continental
United States as projected, would engender intensities and frequencies of sonic booms exceeding these indices over large areas
of the country, inhabited by tens of millions of people. The
negative public reaction, which can be predicted from the studies
already made, would be exceedingly large.108
In asserting and perhaps retaining his jurisdiction over the
atmosphere above his land, the individual should have recourse to
"inverse condemnation" actions which in effect would align him with
those courts which already preserve that area above his land that he
can properly occupy and use. 109 Furthermore, "inverse condemnation"
108. UDALL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
109. Courts have contrasted private and public rights. With regard to private

rights an invasion of air space above land is commonly said to be an invasion of a
landowner's right of possession and quiet enjoyment. And with regard to the public
right, there exists on behalf of any citizen in the United States a public right of
freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United
States. See Note, A Study of the Development And Current Status in Georgia of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7

26

Kline: The SST and Inverse Condemnation

SUMMER

1970]

THE

SST AND INVERSE

CONDEMNATION

can and should be utilized as a means of preventing arbitrary land
use regulation" and a general usurpation of private interests."'
Supersonic transport development will create costs far beyond
traditional amounts of appropriated funds or out of pocket expenditures
normally incurred by the federal government or private airlines in
common air transport. In fact, costs are so high that commercial
airlines have lobbied and pressured the federal government to assume
the major burden of such costs.
The underlying social rationale for the maintenance of actions
in "inverse condemnation" is that of barring Government from forcing
some people to bear public burdens which in all fairness and justice,
should be borne .by the public as a whole. Such a rationale should be
considered in the light of the effects of the sonic boom. Damage
payments, as a result of "inverse condemnation" claims successfully
raised, will immensely add to total costs of development. These additional costs may make the fabrication of a prototype and full-scale
production of the SST economically unjustifiable. The expense of
development, with the additional deterrent of the "inverse condemnation" action, seem to greatly overbalance the effects of international
prestige and other general arguments of the SST's proponents. Consequently, its development at this time seemingly is not desirable.

Recommendations
A solution to the problem of governmental liability for sonic
boom damage calls for a balancing of the public interest in national
defense, rapid transit, and technological development, against the interest of the individual citizen in receiving compensation for just
claims. While we should not deter the public sector from engaging
in public activity, we should also not easily allow a private owner's
land to be taken for such public activity to his detriment.
There has been a plethora of congressional action dealing with
problems of air transportation. Such action has emanated from the
dual desires of minimizing the hazards of air navigation and protecting
the private land owners from the burdens and annoyances accompanying
the advent of technological advancement in air transportation.

Currently, in the legislative process, there are conflicts among
trade associations representing aviation interests, the Federal CornInverse Condemnation Suits by A Landowner For Taking by Aerial Flights, 2 GA.
STATE BAR J.232 (1965).
110. Those who impose land use regulations ought to proceed with care and on a
rational basis. Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35

N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238, 1253 (1960).
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munications Commission, the Federal Aviation Agency, and other
special interest groups. In making findings and recommendations, it
should be required of those involved in the policy and decision making
processes to give due consideration not only to the views and ideas
of the Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation Agency, the
Department of Transportation, and any other agencies and special
interest groups, but to the opinions and considerations of responsible
citizens. The effects upon our environment should be an integral part
of this analysis.
Since the courts have necessarily become involved in a reconciliation of conflicts that have arisen, perhaps they should be the ones to
help extricate us from a somewhat troublesome situation. If so, it is
this writer's feeling that the judicial system should adhere to more
uniform standards and set up guidelines so that all persons, institutions, and governments know the boundaries of permissible activity.
Moreover, they should adjust their determinations to more equitably
distribute the obvious burdens that will inevitably arise with super2
sonic flight."
Finally if the federal government is to permit the SST to fly
without stringent restrictions, it must be prepared, as must congressional
constituents, to pay therefor by way of taxing impositions, economic
repercussions and aesthetic burdens.
In the final analysis, Congress should make the "Go-NoGo"
decision after a lengthy and in depth study of all the factors previously alluded to. Otherwise an unfair burden remains with the courts.
Congress should not blindly approve the SST and rely on the judiciary
to remedy any inequities arising therefrom."' Hopefully, the congressional decision will be "NoGo."
CONCLUSION

Although actual physical damage due to sonic boom is not subject
to exact determination because manifestations will differ according to
varying circumstances, effects generally are comparable to subsonic
112. See Haar, supra note 73, at 556.
113. Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent in Causby, lucidly foresaw the problems
confronting the courts in this area:
The noise of newer, larger, and more powerful planes may grow louder and

louder and disturb people more and more. But the solution of the problems

precipitated by these technological advances and new ways of living cannot come
about through the application of rigid constitutional restraints formulated and
enforced by the courts. What adjustments may have to be made, only the future
can reveal. It seems certain, however, that courts do not possess the techniques
or the personnel to consider and act upon the complex combinations of factors
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/7
entering into the problems. 328 U.S. at 274-75.
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aircraft in the vicinity of municipal airports. Assuming iterative commercial transcontinental flight, landowners over a wide terrain will
be subject to loud noise, property damage, speculative health hazards,
and a general loss of the use and enjoyment of their land. Depending on
location, their real property holdings will sustain a loss in value, and
their bundle of property rights in the main will decimate.
The executive branch of our federal government has adduced a
myriad of factors supporting development of the SST. It has asserted
that this impending endeavor will endear the American people to its
public cause. Its domestic and international implications have been
stressed, and the call has gone out to Congress to reincarnate a recently
dormant political issue. It is this writer's opinion that the call should
not be heeded, and that no federal governmental decision to proceed
with the SST should be implemented; "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
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